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Abstract:  
This paper describes the transmission of the recent financial crisis to Japan and compares the 
monetary policy reactions by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) with those during the 1990s, and with reactions 
by other major central banks.  The paper first reviews the recent literature on the origins and 
transmission mechanisms of financial crises. We then consider how the financial crisis was transmitted 
to Japan and describe the responses by BoJ. The paper then proceeds and analyses the lessons that 
have been learnt by the BoJ and other central banks from the financial crisis of the 1990s.  
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1.  Introduction 
Japan is currently experiencing its second major financial crisis of the last two 
decades. While the first crisis of the 1990s was entirely home-made and had effects that 
were largely confined to Japan, the recent crisis originated outside Japan – mainly in the 
US and UK – and was transmitted not only to Japan, but to all other major economies 
worldwide.
3 The Bank of Japan (BoJ) and other Japanese government agencies, such as 
the Financial Services Agency (FSA), started to react to the financial crisis in September 
2008, taking into account the experiences of the first financial crisis. Compared to 
measures undertaken in other countries, especially in the USA, but also in Europe, 
monetary policy reaction in Japan was quantitatively rather modest and only temporary.
4 
This modest reaction may be due not only to the fact that Japan was hit less hard by the 
recent crisis, but also because the authorities had learnt from experiences acquired 
during the 1990s financial crisis. 
In this paper, we describe the propagation of the recent financial crisis to Japan, 
analyze the reactions of the BoJ and compare them with those in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), the UK, and the US. Although the recent financial crisis was a 
global phenomenon, the Japanese case is of particular interest for the following three 
reasons. Firstly, during the 1990s financial crisis, the BoJ already had to act as a lender 
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of last resort and provided financial assistance to individual financial institutions and to 
financial markets, so as to prevent a meltdown of the financial system. Differences 
between policy reactions then and now help us to understand what form of financial 
assistance is appropriate during a financial crisis in order to regain financial stability.
5 
Secondly, all major central banks have significantly reduced interest rates and almost 
shifted towards a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and one of quantitative/qualitative 
easing (QEP). While this is new territory for most central banks, the Bank of Japan had 
already pursued such a policy until 2006. Hence, the monetary policy measures 
undertaken by the BoJ in the late 1990s may serve as a blueprint for ZIRP and QEP in 
other countries during a financial crisis. Finally, as with some other major central banks, 
the BoJ has augmented its monetary policy framework and, for example, introduced a 
deposit facility which did not exist in Japan during the first financial crisis. Thus, the 
Japanese case enables us to understand the functions of such a deposit facility and why 
some central banks started to adjust their monetary policy toolkits. 
To date, the literature offers only a few analyses of the impact of the recent world 
financial crisis on Japan and of the actions taken by BoJ. Kamezaki (2009) is a notable 
exception, providing a short chronological overview of reactions by the BoJ after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, but without comparing them with 
reactions in other countries. Another is Sato (2009), who describes the current state of 
Japan’s financial system and analyses FSA’s recent responses. Borio and Nelson (2008), 
Chailloux et al. (2008), Committee on the Global Financial System Report (2008), Bank 
of Japan (2009a, 2009b), and Bank for International Settlements (2009a, 2009b) analyze 
rescue programs that were adopted in several countries, after the Lehman Brothers 
default, in order to support banks and other financial institutions. None of these papers, 
however, relates the recent policy measures in Japan since 2008 to the experiences of 
the first financial crisis, but rather treat the recent financial crisis as a historically unique 
event.
6 They fail to explain the lessons that were learnt in Japan from the financial crisis 
during the 1990s. Therefore, these studies do not enable policymakers to determine 
appropriate reactions to a financial crisis. 
In this paper, we bridge this gap and compare the policy reactions in Japan during 
the recent crisis with those in Japan during the 1990s, and with recent actions in the 
member countries of the EMU, the UK, and the US. Our objective is to determine how 
severely Japan was affected by the recent financial crisis and whether the Japanese 
authorities reacted differently to the recent crisis, than during the 1990s or to the actions 
of authorities in other countries. We consider the extent to which the recent reactions 
by the Japanese authorities can be traced back to experiences during the first financial 
crisis and what lessons have been learnt. Our research reveals that Japanese banks were 
barely involved in the production and distribution of subprime-related products and 
                                                 
5 In doing so, one has to bear in mind that Japan has, in the meantime, improved its regulatory framework 
and adopted a financial safety net which is widely regarded as being state of the arts (Tamaki, 2008; 
Tanaka, 2008). Hence, differences in policy reactions during the 1990s and the current financial crisis 
may also be due to an improved regulatory framework. 
6 An exception, however, is Shiratsuka (2009) who examines Japan`s experience of QEP until 2006 in the 
light of current reactions. Another exception is Hoshi and Kashyap (2010), who analyze the tools used 
by the US government to rehabilitate the US banking industry and compare them with measures in 
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explains how the financial crisis was transmitted to Japan through capital outflows. We 
argue that the Japanese authorities reacted differently to the recent financial crisis than 
other central banks, not because Japan was hit less severely by the current crisis, but 
because Japan had indeed learned from its experiences during the first crisis. 
Since the purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare monetary policy 
reactions to financial crises, we concentrate on the time period between 2008 and 2010 
and do not address in detail the reactions to the great earthquake and tsunami in East 
Japan on March 11, 2011. The Bank of Japan reacted immediately to this catastrophe 
and injected 15 trillion Yen into the interbank market (far more than after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers). In consequence, the financial markets remained resilient and there 
was no serious interruption to the payments system after the Earthquake.
7 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the origins and propagation of a financial crisis in general. In Section 3, we 
turn to the Japanese case and analyse the origins of the recent crisis, as well as the 
reactions by the BoJ. In Section 4, we compare these policy measures with the crisis of 
the 1990s and with recent policy reactions in other countries. Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
2.  Origins and propagation of a financial crisis: Recent literature 
The recent literature on financial crises attempts to address three interrelated 
questions. Firstly, what causes a financial crisis? Secondly, what makes it spread 
throughout a national banking industry, across borders and into the real economy? 
Thirdly, what are the appropriate policy responses to a financial crisis? 
With respect to the first question, there is general consensus that a financial crisis 
is characterized by a crisis of the national banking industry.
8 Banks are fragile 
institutions that simultaneously grant loans and issue demandable deposits. Thus, they 
create liquidity but are simultaneously exposed to the risk of a bank run, i.e. a situation 
in which all depositors, even without actually facing liquidity needs, wish to withdraw 
their deposits. Such a run may result from a coordination failure among depositors, i.e., 
depositors withdraw deposits because they believe that other depositors will also do so 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Alternatively, a bank run may be triggered by changing 
fundamentals and by expectations that a bank`s capital cushion will be depleted when 
assets devaluate (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988; Diamond and Rajan, 2000). 
Regarding the devaluation of assets, especially with regard to real estate and 
securitized financial products, the literature offers three major strands of explanation. 
One argues that swings in asset prices are due to monetary policy changes and that bank 
failures stem mainly from a less accommodative monetary policy, resulting in a collapse 
of the housing market and of the securitization market. (Taylor, 2007: 8-10).
9 A second 
                                                 
7 While monetary policy, therefore, contributes to cushioning the short-term consequences of the disaster, 
the long-term consequences are likely become evident in Japan’s fiscal balance (IMF, 2011a: 40). 
8 Banking crises are sometimes accompanied by currency crises and/or state defaults.  
9 Measured by the S&P/Case-Shiller-Index, US housing price inflation reached 20 percent during parts of 
the period 2000-2004. See Taylor (2007: 3). Since the peak in 2006, residential and industrial real estate 
prices dropped by more than 30 percent. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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strand blames the increased diffusion of the ‘originate-and-distribute-business’ in 
banking and the massive increase in the size of markets for credit risks, as causing the 
banking crisis. ‘Originate-and-distribute-business’ refers to a bank not holding a loan on 
its balance sheet but, either selling it directly or buying a synthetic product – such as a 
credit default swap (CDS) – that effectively insures the bank against non-performance.
10 
Both direct loan sales and the use of CDS allow a separation of credit risks from loans. 
This strengthens bank ability to manage risk, because credit risks can be valued more 
accurately and more easily be diversified (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004: 36). On the 
other hand, however, asymmetric information may cause efficiency problems, due to 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Parlour and Winton, 2008; Heyde and Neyer, 2010).  
Finally, the third strand accuses the decrease in asset prices of bursting an asset 
bubble, i.e., to the sudden reversal of a speculative price increase (see, e.g., Kindleberger, 
1978). An asset bubble is a situation in which market participants buy assets in 
expectation of a further increase in asset prices. This increase in asset demand is 
financed by loans which are expected to be repaid by gains from asset price increases. In 
such a case, the expectation of rising asset prices can be self-fulfilling. However, if asset 
prices reach a certain ceiling, the process reverses and asset prices start to fall. 
According to this explanation, housing prices in the US increased merely because 
market participants expected further future price increases, and started to fall in 2004, 
when housing prices reached unsustainable levels relative to borrowers’ income. 
The literature quoted above offers explanations as to why banks with large 
exposures in the housing and subprime markets may get into trouble and ultimately 
originate a financial crisis. We now explore the literature explaining how the financial 
crisis is propagated i.e. why other banks, with no housing and subprime market 
exposure, also got into difficulties. Such financial contagion may be caused by 
imperfections in the interbank markets which channel liquidity from banks with excess 
liquidity to banks with liquidity needs. Normally, the interbank market operates 
smoothly, with interest rates for unsecured interbank loans being only marginally higher 
than interest rates on secured interbank loans or on central bank loans. Furthermore, 
interbank markets tend to be very liquid, with a large number of participants and high 
turnover. During a financial crisis, however, the funding of interbank markets becomes 
severely impaired, with rising interest rates and increased liquidity hoarding by banks.
11 
Instead of lending at the unsecured interbank market, banks start to use central bank 
deposit and lending facilities excessively. Therefore, banks take refuge at central banks, 
which are forced to simulate the functioning of the interbank markets. 
Such a breakdown in the functioning of the interbank markets may be caused 
either by increases in aggregate credit risk or by increases in aggregate liquidity risk. The 
first cause, an increase in aggregate credit risk, is relevant only for the unsecured 
segment of the interbank markets. It refers to a situation in which participants perceive 
                                                 
10 For more details on the functioning of the ‘originate-and-distribute-business’ see European Central 
Bank (2008a). 
11 Liquidity hoarding and interbank market spreads are reported, e.g., for US interbank markets and 
interbank markets in the Euro area. A standard measure of tensions in the unsecured interbank market 
is the spread between three months loan borrowing costs (measured by e.g. Euribor or LIBOR) and the 
overnight index swap (OIS) in three months` time, which measures the difference between unsecured 
and secured interbank loans. See Heider et al. (2009: 2); Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009). U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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a decline in the repayment probability of an interbank loan, i.e. an increase in 
counterparty risk. This increase in risk causes an increase in interbank interest rates. As 
long as the overall level of counterparty risk is low, interest rates are also low and there 
is full participation in the interbank market. However, once counterparty risk raises 
interest rates in the interbank markets rise beyond a certain threshold level and safer 
banks drop out of the interbank markets, this adverse selection causes a further rise in 
interest rates. In this situation, an increase in the dispersion of counterparty risk alone, 
without an increase in the level of risk, can lead to a breakdown of the interbank market, 
either because lenders hoard liquidity (i.e. supply dries up) or borrowers drop out, 
because of excessively high interest rates (i.e. demand dries up; Heider, Hoerova and 
Holthausen, 2009).
12  
The second cause of an interbank market breakdown is an increase in aggregate 
liquidity risk which, in contrast to increases in aggregate credit risk, is relevant to both 
secured and unsecured segments of the interbank market. This scenario refers to a 
situation in which participants in the interbank markets perceive either a decline in the 
quality of available collateral or an increase of the probability of a liquidity outflow in 
the near future. Consequently, with an increased liquidity risk, term money markets 
become illiquid, while overnight money markets become more liquid, and the interest 
rate spread between term money markets and overnight money markets increase. 
Increased liquidity hoarding hence leads to a rising liquidity interest rate premium and to 
a significant decline in unsecured term money market volumes (Eisenschmidt and 
Tapking, 2009: 6-7). Moreover, it may result in a drying-out of interbank markets, if 
central banks offer a deposit facility and banks prefer to hold excess liquidity reserves at 
central banks, instead of lending to the interbank markets.
13 
If interbank markets fail, bank leverage problems and liquidity problems spread to 
other banks, and this may exert a substantial impact on real activity and cause 
macroeconomic phenomena, such as credit crunches and liquidity shortages. A credit 
crunch is a situation in which bank equity has fallen substantially and where banks are 
capital constrained and are unable to offer loans to investors (Tirole, 2007: 478-9).
14 A 
credit crunch may occur in a situation where information is distributed asymmetrically 
between a loan applicant (investor) and a large number of financiers (Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997). Capital regulations, such as minimum capital adequacy ratios set by the 
Basel committee and enforced by national regulatory authorities, can prevent excessive 
risk taking by banks. However, such regulations may also influence bank lending 
behaviour procyclically, i.e., they have a relatively more severe impact on bank lending 
during a recession than during a boom. This “procyclicality” effect results from the fact 
that under Basel II, regulations minimum capital adequacy ratios depend on the internal 
or external rating of the bank`s assets, which often varies pro-cyclically, because ratings 
                                                 
12 For another paper that models the influence of credit risk on bank lending, see Longstaff (2010). 
13 For other models of a liquidity risk, based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), see Allen and Gale (2000); 
Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009). 
14 This situation is sometimes also referred to as the “lending channel” and focuses on the influence of 
bank balance sheets on economic activity. A related situation is called the “balance sheet channel”, 
which focuses on the influence of firms` balance sheet on their economic activity. This refers to a 
situation in which firms` cash flows and collateral values have fallen substantially and their increased 
leverage reduces investment. See Tirole (2007: 471). EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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are often downgraded during recessions and upgraded during booms (Amato and 
Furfine, 2004). This results in a similar procyclicality of risk weights, which are larger 
during recessions than in a boom. Banks therefore have more leeway during a boom to 
leverage their capital then during a recession. 
Policy makers may react to bank leverage and liquidity problems by (i.) bank 
recapitalizations and by (ii.) supplying liquidity assistance to banks. In addition, they may 
(iii.) conduct a policy of credit easing and quantitative or qualitative easing, so as to 
facilitate corporate financing. Bank recapitalizations may, in principle, be conducted in 
two ways; either (via the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet) by buying toxic assets 
and transferring them to a ‘bad bank’, or (via the liability side of the balance sheet) by 
injecting fresh equity capital (or junior debt) into the bank (Aghion, Bolton and Fries, 
1999; Osano, 2002). While recapitalizations ensure the solvency of insolvent banks, 
emergency liquidity assistance by a lender of last resort (LLR) aims at restoring the 
liquidity of either a single bank or the entire banking industry. Emergency liquidity 
assistance may be necessary when there is an increased liquidity preference in the 
economy, which results in a run on a single bank, as in the event of banking panic (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). The provision of emergency liquidity by a LLR (the central bank or the 
deposit insurance corporation) may protect banks against such incidents. Financial 
assistance may either take the form of lending to the entire market or the provision of 
liquidity on special terms to a single institution. Liquidity provision to the market as a 
whole is inefficient, as long as the interbank market does not work smoothly and the 
transfer of liquidity from one bank to another is impaired. In this case, the central bank 
or deposit insurance must ensure that individual, solvent banks with a liquidity shortage 
will receive the liquidity needed against collateral (Flannery, 1996).  
Although a LLR may shield the banking sector from financial crises, the drawback 
is that it creates moral hazard on the part of banks that are in effect insured against 
mismanagement of all types of risks.
15 In order to limit these adverse effects, the 
literature already suggests providing LLR liquidity to the market only at a penalty rate, 
i.e. exceeding the market rate. Demanding a penalty rate, however, may aggravate a 
bank’s solvency problem and also send signals to market participants that the bank is in 
trouble. Moreover, it may even provide an incentive to managers to ‘gamble for 
resurrection’, i.e. to invest in projects with higher risks and higher returns in the hope of 
surviving, if the gamble pays off.  
‘Constructive ambiguity’ may be another mechanism for constraining moral 
hazard. It can be defined as a situation in which the central bank retains discretion as to 
whether, when and under what conditions financial support will be provided to an 
individual financial institution. If the central bank does not disclose whether or not 
financial support will be granted, banks will not know individually whether they will be 
rescued or not, which might have the advantage of avoiding imitation effects. If the 
central bank is ambiguous about the conditions of financial assistance, it keeps bank 
shareholders and management uncertain about the costs they will have to bear in the 
event of financial assistance (Freixas, 1999; Cordella and Levy-Yeyati, 2003).
16 
                                                 
15 For a survey of the lender-of-last-resort-literature, see Freixas et al. (2004). 
16 A central bank may also practice ‘constructive ambiguity’, not because it wants to constrain moral 
hazard, but rather because it receives a random and non-verifiable signal about bank’s solvency and U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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While a central bank, as the LLR, targets the financial industry, intending to 
cushion the consequences of a banking crisis for the real economy, it may alternatively 
reduce interest rates by increasing liquidity in the interbank markets. The Zero Interest 
Rate Policy (ZIRP), however, comes to a halt after interest rates have reached zero. 
When this occurs, ZIRP is sometimes accompanied by a policy of quantitative and 
qualitative easing (QEP). Under ‘quantitative easing’, the central bank expands the size 
of its balance sheet through an increase in its monetary liabilities, i.e., base money. In 
contrast to conventional monetary policy instruments which address short-term money 
markets, under QEP, central banks have to take unconventional monetary measures, 
such as outright open market operations or direct lending to companies, none of which 
are part of the regular monetary policy tool kit during normal times. This usually means 
either that gross bank reserves expand beyond the threshold necessary to achieve the 
interest rate target, or that the central bank is providing liquidity directly to borrowers 
and investors to credit markets. The aim of both these measures is to reduce long-term 
interest rates which are decisive both for investment and long-term consumption 
decisions. 
Since central banks do not control long-term interest rates directly, they attempt 
to influence expected short-term interest rates. If market participants expect a fall in 
short-term interest rates in the future as a result of quantitative easing, then long-term 
interest rates will also fall, which might have an expansionary impact on the real 
economic activity (Benford et al., 2009; Bini-Smaghi, 2009). In order to exert such an 
influence on market participants’ expectations of future short-term interest rates and 
hence on long-term interest rates, the continuation of QEP must be credible and its 
termination linked to the occurrence of a verifiable event, such as the end of consumer 
price deflation and an increase in the rate of consumer price inflation above zero 
percent. 
This indirect influence of quantitative easing might be supplemented by 
‘qualitative’ or ‘credit easing’, where the central bank changes the composition of the 
assets on its balance sheet towards less liquid and more risky assets. Normally, the 
provision of liquidity to financial institutions via interbank markets exposes central 
banks only to a low level of risk, as loans are usually short-term, over-collateralized and 
collateralized with high quality assets. Under qualitative easing, however, the central 
bank takes more term risk and credit risk into its portfolio, provides loans for the longer 
term and accepts lower-quality assets as collateral. Quantitative easing may reduce 
expected short-term interest rates as well as long-term interest rates (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2009a: 66; Bernanke, 2009). 
3.  The recent financial crisis and policy reactions in Japan 
The recent financial crisis started in Autumn 2006 when – after a lengthy boom in 
the housing markets – real estate prices in the US finally began to fall.
17  
                                                                                                                                        
makes financial assistance dependent on the outcome of the signal which cannot be observed by 
outsiders. See Repullo (2000). 
17 Acharya et al. (2009), Rajan (2009) and Dewatripont et al. (2010) give a short chronology of the recent 
financial crisis between April 2007 and March 2009, and an overview of the causes of the crisis. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Financial instruments that were issued in order to finance real estate investments 
subsequently lost value and endangered the financial stability of mortgage banks. In 
April 2007, ‘New Century Financial’, the largest US mortgage bank in the subprime 
segment, went into bankruptcy. In July 2007, rating agencies started to downgrade a 
large number of securities that were collateralized with mortgage loans, which as a 
result, declined substantially in value. As a consequence, financial firms which were 
dependent on financial funds borrowed on international money markets and which had 
used asset backed securities as collateral, encountered serious liquidity problems. In the 
US, two hedge funds belonging to ‘Bear Sterns’ failed and large European banks 
suffered from liquidity shortages. In August 2007, the US Fed and the European Central 
Bank expanded the liquidity supply and the Fed started to reduce interest rates. In 
September 2007, the British mortgage bank ‘Northern Rock’ suffered from a liquidity 
shortage which resulted in a bank run; the bank was nationalized in February 2008. In 
September 2008, the US Government assumed ‘Fannie Mae’ and ‘Freddy Mac’, the 
largest US home loan banks, under public conservatorship. On September 15, 2008, the 
US investment bank ‘Merrill Lynch’ was taken over by ‘Bank of America’, and ‘Lehman 
Brothers’ collapsed. 
Unlike banks in Europe or the US, Japanese banks were only marginally affected 
by the financial crisis, that is, until the failure of Lehman Brothers, because they neither 
invested directly in subprime-related products nor conducted the ‘originate-and-
distribute’-business with structured financial products, such as credit default swaps, on a 
large scale.
18 This low engagement in the markets for subprime-related and structured 
financial products followed from experiences acquired during the first financial crisis, 
which resulted in more conservative business policies. Additionally, Japanese banks 
focus more on traditional banking services and are less involved in the production and 
distribution of securitized financial products. Consequently, Japanese banks suffered 
only small subprime-related losses amounting to 1,038 billion Yen by September 2010 
(Table 1). These losses represented less than 2.2 percent of Japanese bank Tier-1-capital 
and were largely absorbed by capital buffers which exceeded mandatory requirements 
even before the outbreak of the financial crisis (IMF, 2008: 4; Bank of Japan, 2008a: 12; 
Shirakawa, 2008: 9). 
                                                 
18 Japan shares this feature also with other Asian economies where financial institution losses and public 
capital injections were also small. Estimated total bank write-downs on toxic loans and securities 
between 2007 and 2010 are: USD 156 bn. for Asia (Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand and 
Australia); USD 885 bn. for the US; USD 665 bn. for Euro Area; and USD 455 bn. for the UK. See 
Bank of Japan (2009a: 9) and IMF (2010a: 12). Obviously, holdings of toxic assets were smaller in Asia 
than in other World regions. U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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Table 1:  Exposure of Japanese deposit-taking institutions1) to subprime-related products (in Billion Yen) 
Direct Investments  ‚Originate-and-Distribute’-
Business 
Date
2)  Tier-1-
Capital  Book 
value 
Realized 
Losses
7) 
Book 
value 
Realized 
Losses
6) 
09/2007 49,408
3) 1,407  141  138  19 
12/2007  49,408
3)  1,519  442  202  85 
03/2008 50,071
4) 1,019  725  107  288 
06/2008  50,071
4)  958  754  64  305 
09/2008 50,071
4) 797  803  26  316 
12/2008  50,071
4)  565  919  21  317 
03/2009 47,920
5) 449  1,001  17  324 
06/2009  47,920
5)  407  1,040  17  323 
09/2009 47,920
5) 341  1,046  18  322 
12/2009  47,920
5)  320  1,034  23  322 
03/2010 56,733
6)  355 1,029  6  320 
06/2010  56,733
6)  327  1,046  /  / 
09/2010 56,733
6) 305  1,038  /  / 
1) Major banks, regional banks, co-operative financial institutions 
2) End of month. 
3) End-March 2007. 
4) End-March 2008 
5) End-March 2009 
6) End-March 2010 
7) Accumulated since April 1, 2007. 
Source Financial Services Agency; http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2009/20090911-10.html 
 
Due to this limited subprime involvement of Japanese banks, funding costs on 
unsecured interbank markets increased much less and were considerably less volatile 
than in Europe and the US. Between June 2007 and January 2009, the three month 
LIBOR-OIS spread for Japanese Yen increased to around 50 basis points, much less 
than the spreads for European Euros, for British Pounds and for US Dollars, which 
increased to around 200 basis points (Euro), 300 basis points (GBP) and 350 basis 
points (USD) (Bank of Japan 2011b: 31). Furthermore, the Tokyo interbank market rate 
(TIBOR), the reference interbank rate for prime Japanese domestic banks, also 
remained stable. In addition to the low subprime involvement, this was attributed to a 
stable deposit base of Japanese banks, which finance only 10 percent of their liabilities 
in the interbank market.
19 Finally, corporate bonds spreads over government bond yields 
                                                 
19 Unlike interest spreads inside Japan, spreads between three month (Japanese Yen) TIBOR and 
(Japanese Yen) LIBOR started to rise in September 2007. While TIBOR features mainly Japanese banks EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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rose in Japan far less than in Europe and in the US (International Monetary Fund, 2008: 
6; Bank of Japan, 2008a: 9; Bank of Japan, 2009a: 7). Hence, there are barely any signs 
that the current financial crisis originated inside Japan or is a result of an excessively 
high risk appetite on the part of Japanese financial institutions. 
This contrasts completely with the financial crisis of the 1990s in the run-up to 
which interest rates were regulated and banks were implicitly protected under the 
“convoy system”. Under this system, banking supervision and regulation were 
conducted “in such a way as not to undermine the viability of the weakest banks” 
(Nakaso, 2001: 2). Instead, financial firm survival was guaranteed implicitly, as long as 
all guidance by the BoJ or Ministry of Finance was observed. Disclosure rules were lax 
and takeover bids difficult to implement. Accordingly, market discipline was lacking and 
banks did not behave as profit-maximizers, but increased their loans volume far beyond 
the profit-maximizing level (Revankar and Yoshino, 2008). The increased loan supply by 
banks fueled housing prices that had started to fall after 1989 (Nakaso, 2001; Baba et al., 
2005; Yoshino, 2010). 
Financial liberalization started in the early 1970s, but proceeded only gradually 
until the end of the decade, when interest rate liberalization began. Large-scale 
manufacturing firms, as the banks’ main clients, raised funds increasingly from capital 
markets, and banks reacted by lending to the construction sector, where the additional 
loan supply fueled housing prices. When the financial liberalization process was 
completed, market participants began to shift their investments away from the real 
estate sector, where prices then started to fall after 1989. The resulting sharp decline in 
asset prices caused substantial losses for firms, which could not pay the interest on 
borrowed funds, and banks remained stuck with nonperforming loans on their 
portfolios (Bebenroth et al., 2009). The result was financial turmoil which, however, 
remained limited to Japan, because of the minimal use of securitization and ‘originate-
to-distribute’ business models, even during the 1980s. 
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 marks the start of the current 
financial crisis spreading to Japan, the international capital movements being a major 
transmission channel (Table 2).
20 While the capital and financial account was always 
negative between 2005 and 2010, the deficit increased to ¥22,538 billion in 2007 and 
remained high in 2008. Short-term portfolio investments contributed significantly to the 
deficit in the capital and financial account. While negative outward portfolio 
investments have increased since 2007 in absolute terms, inward portfolio investment 
also turned negative in 2008 and 2009, meaning that (foreign) investors decreased their 
short-term investments in Japan. 
                                                                                                                                        
in the Tokyo market, Yen-LIBOR is dominated by offshore European and US banks. Hence, a rising 
spread reflected Japanese bank concerns of a perceived credit risk with respect to foreign banks. See 
IMF (2008: 6) and Iwada (2009). 
20 The sum of current account, capital and financial account, change in reserve assets and errors and 
omissions is by definition always equal to zero. U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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Table 2: Japan’s Balance of Payments: 2005-2010 (in Billion Yen) 
Position  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
  2010
1) 
Current  account  18,259 19,839 24,794 16,380 13,287 17,080 
Capital and 
financial account  -14,007  -12,296  -22,538  -18,390  -12,645  -12,859 
of which:             
outward portfolio 
investments  -23,567 -9,689  -12,930 -13,978 -16,304 -25,797 
inward portfolio 
investments  20,346  22,199  24,923  -10,344  -4,951  9,608 
Change in reserve 
assets  -2,456 -3,720 -4,297 -3,200 -2,527 -3,793 
Errors and 
omissions  -1,796  -3,663  2,042  5,210  1,884  -429 
1) Preliminary data 
Source: Bank of Japan; http://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/brp/ron_2011/ron110707a.htm/ 
 
The impact of international capital movements on Japanese financial markets can 
also be observed in Japan’s interbank markets. Despite the fact that interest spreads did 
not increase significantly, Japan’s interbank markets shrunk considerably, as banks 
began to limit their provision of funds (Figure 1). Total amounts outstanding in the Call 
Money Market fell from more than ¥659,000 trillion in December 2007 to around 
¥250,000 trillion in September 2009.
 21 Especially foreign banks in Japan substantially 
reduced their supply of funds to the Japanese interbank markets while regional banks 
became more reluctant to invest under the complementary deposit facility introduced by 
BoJ (Bank of Japan, 2009a: 43).
22 In addition to this short-term liquidity outflow, foreign 
investors became net sellers on Japanese stock markets and net foreign purchases of 
Japanese equities became negative. Especially hedge funds that faced liquidity 
constraints in funding and increased risk exposure, sold stocks (Bank of Japan, 2009a: 
56). This was crucial, since foreign holdings of Japanese stocks account for a quarter of 
market capitalization and foreigners for nearly two thirds of market turnover. 
                                                 
21 Data from BoJ website. 
22 Because of this outflow of short-term liquidity, it seems that Japanese financial markets helped to 
stabilize financial markets abroad. See also Kumakura (2008). EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Figure 1: Japanese Call Money Market: Amounts Outstanding (2007-2009, in Billion Yen) 
 
Source: Bank of Japan: Time-series data. http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html. 
 
As a consequence of capital outflows, the Nikkei stock index fell from 18,000 JPY 
in July 2007 to 7,000 JPY in March 2009. It subsequently climbed to around 9,000 JPY, 
before the great earthquake in March 2011. This major net fall in stock prices depressed 
the asset value of Japanese banks which hold around one third of their Tier-1-capital in 
stocks. It heavily impaired their capital basis and especially those of major banks. 
Although banks’ stock holdings are valued at acquisition prices and included 
considerable unrealized gains (from which, under Basel rules, 45% may be included in 
Tier-2-capital), the fall in equity not only eliminated these unrealized gains, but also 
affected Tier-1-capital (IMF, 2008: 8).  
As a result of the increased liquidity preference worldwide, interest rate spreads 
on commercial papers (CPs) and on commercial bonds (CBs) over government bonds 
increased sharply, in particular for companies with lower ratings (Juhara, 2009).
23 At the 
same time, the volume of outstanding CPs and CBs decreased considerably (Bank of 
Japan, 2009a: 44), and particularly companies with lower or medium credit ratings had 
difficulty selling such papers. This credit crunch occurred mainly because of rising 
concerns about the funding availability of firms and decreased risk appetite by investors 
who preferred to increase precautionary liquidity demand, instead of holding corporate 
bonds (Nichikin Tankan, 2009). Large companies were able to compensate for this 
decreased turnover in CPs and CBs, by increasing their bank borrowing. For small and 
medium-sized companies, however, bank borrowings fell below the 2007 level 
(Shirakawa, 2008: 9; Bank of Japan, 2008c). 
                                                 
23 Besides, the ratings of a large number of firms were downgraded. See Bank of Japan (2009a: 60). U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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Although the recent financial turmoil did not originate in Japan, the impact of the 
crisis on the country was severe, because of Japan’s integration into the world economy. 
Japan’s real GDP growth rate fell to -1.2 percent in 2008 and to -6.3 percent in 2009, 
constituting one of the largest fall in real output among major OECD countries. In 
2010, output growth returned to 3.9 percent, but the projected growth rate for 2011 is 
1.4 percent, still far below the estimated average growth rate (2.4 percent) of all 
advanced economies (IMF, 2010b: 2; 2011b: 2).
 24 
The Bank of Japan started to react to developments in financial markets in 
September 2008. BoJ implemented two reductions in interest rates and made several 
adjustments to their monetary policy framework. The objectives underlying these 
measures were, firstly, to ensure stability in financial markets and, secondly, to facilitate 
corporate finance.
25 In order to ensure financial market stability, immediately after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, Bank of Japan had signed a bilateral currency liquidity 
agreement or swap facility with the US Fed, which allows BoJ to acquire US Dollars 
from the Federal Reserve and lend them to domestic financial institutions (Bernanke, 
2009).
26 This was the first time BoJ used domestic assets as collateral for USD credits. 
The purpose of these measures was to satisfy the increased worldwide liquidity demand 
for US-Dollars and to alleviate pressure from US short-term money markets.
27  
To ease financing, especially for small and medium-sized companies and to 
prevent a Yen appreciation, the Bank of Japan decided to lower the target rate for the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate twice by 20 basis points. The new target rate was 
lowered from (around) 0.5 percent to (around) 0.3 percent on October 31
st, 2008 and to 
(around) 0.1 percent on December 19, 2008.
28 On the same dates, the basic loan rate 
and the basic discount rate were reduced to 0.3 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively. 
Moreover, BoJ introduced a ‘complementary deposit facility’ allowing banks to receive 
interest payments on excess balances with the central bank; the interest rate paid by BoJ 
was fixed at 0.1 percent.
29 This facility allows BoJ to attract liquidity and prevents the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate from falling significantly below the target rate.  
                                                 
24 The world economic outlook projections for 2012 are 2.1 percent for Japan and 2.4 percent for 
advanced economies. See IMF (2011b: 2). 
25 Appendix 1 offers a chronological compilation of the policy measures taken by BoJ. The information 
presented in this section refers to Kamezaki (2009: 6-9) and Bank of Japan (2011a). For further 
information, also refer to the website of Bank of Japan. 
26 On September 18th, 2008, BoJ also started to conduct USD funds-supplying operations against pooled 
collateral, as a coordinated measure with five other central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of England, 
Federal Reserve, ECB, and Swiss National Bank). 
27 The first two operations were conducted through market-rate competitive auctions; from October 31 
on, funds were provided at a fixed interest rate for an unlimited amount, against pooled collateral. See 
Kamezaki (2009: 6).  
28 Since the end of quantitative easing policy, the uncollateralized overnight call rate is the main policy 
target of BoJ. Through the use of its policy instruments, BoJ encourages this call rate at the target level.  
29 The “complementary lending facility” is equivalent to the Eurosystem’s “deposit facility” which has 
existed since 1999. The US Fed., like BoJ, also introduced a deposit facility during the recent financial 
crisis in October 2008. See Borio and Nelson (2008); European Central Bank (2009a). EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Beginning on October 14
th, 2008, Bank of Japan introduced several measures to 
secure the stability of the financial system. In order to enhance the stability of the stock 
market and to gauge market developments, BoJ decided to suspend the sale of stocks 
purchased from financial institutions on the stock exchange. Furthermore, on February 
3
rd, 2009, BoJ decided to resume its purchases of stocks held by financial institutions. 
Both measures were announced as temporary and served a twofold purpose: to stabilize 
stock market prices and to reduce market risk associated with stockholdings. Moreover, 
on March 17
th, 2009, BoJ announced its readiness to provide subordinated loans to 
financial institutions up to a total amount of one trillion Yen; a limit of 350 billion Yen 
per financial institution was set by BoJ. Eligible are banks subject to international capital 
standards and those deemed creditworthy. As an additional measure to ensure stability 
of the financial markets, on October 18
th, 2008, BoJ expanded its securities lending 
facility, which allows BoJ to sell Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) with repurchase 
agreements; the minimum fee rate applied for this facility was lowered from 1.0 percent 
to 0.5 percent. Furthermore, BoJ announced that it will add floating-rate JGBs, 
inflation-indexed JGBs and 30-years Government Bonds to the list of eligible JGBs for 
its repo operations. 
Two months later, on December 19
th, 2008, BoJ started a policy of “credit easing” 
which had already been followed during the first financial crisis. Since the target rate for 
the uncollateralized overnight call rate had already been lowered to 0.1 percent, with 
further cuts therefore being almost impossible, BoJ decided to increase the amount of 
outright purchases of JGBs. Also on December 19
th, the range of JGBs accepted in 
these outright purchases was expanded (floating-rate JGBs, inflation-indexed JGBs and 
30-years Government bonds were added to the list of eligible JGBs). Subsequently, debt 
instruments (bonds, dematerialized commercial papers, bills, commercial papers and 
loans on deed) issued by real estate investment corporations, government guaranteed 
dematerialized CBs and loans on deeds to the government and to municipal 
governments were all accepted as eligible. The same applied to bonds issued by foreign 
governments (US, UK, France and Germany).  
To facilitate corporate financing, Bank of Japan announced on October 14
th, 
2008, that it would increase the frequency and size of its commercial paper (CP) repo 
operations, which were generally conducted quarterly. On December 2
nd, the range of 
corporate debt that was accepted as eligible collateral in repo operations was expanded. 
The BoJ also introduced a new credit facility called “Special Funds-Supplying 
Operations to Facilitate Corporate Financing”, which utilizes corporate debt as eligible 
collateral. Through this facility, financial institutions may borrow unlimited amounts of 
(three months) funds from BoJ at an interest rate equal to the target rate for the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate. These operations were initially conducted twice a 
month, but from February 2009 onwards, even once a week (Bank of Japan, 2008b).  
On December 19
th, 2008, the BoJ announced the introduction of outright 
purchases of commercial papers (CPs) as a temporary measure.
 30 This meant a much 
higher degree of credit-risk taking, than if commercial papers are taken as collateral for 
providing credit to financial institutions; it also meant a deeper involvement of BoJ in 
microeconomic resource allocation. For these reasons, BoJ decided not to buy these 
                                                 
30 On January 22nd, 2009, BoJ also announced outright purchases of corporate bonds. U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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instruments directly from the issuer, but only from financial institutions that were 
counterparties of the Bank and to buy them using competitive auctions. The total 
amount of purchases was limited to three trillion Yen; the outstanding amount if a 
single issuer’s CP purchased by BoJ is not to exceed 100 billion Yen. 
As a consequence of BoJ’s operations, tightness in money market conditions 
eased and interest rate spreads declined. BoJ evaluated the impact of its measures on the 
spreads between issuing rates on CP’s with credit ratings a-1+, a-1, and a-2 and three 
months OIS rates. The spreads reveal risk premiums on corporate credit risk and on CP 
market liquidity risk. These dependent variables were regressed against three 
independent variables, such as the implied volatility of stock prices (as a proxy variable 
for changes in uncertainty over corporate financing), spreads between TIBOR and OIS 
rates (as a measure of the cost of unsecured bank lending) and the share of funds 
obtained through operations by BoJ in the amount outstanding in CPs (as a proxy for 
Bank of Japan’s measures to facilitate corporate financing). The results reveal significant 
downward effects of the corporate financing measures taken by BoJ on CP issuance 
rates. Hence, these measures were effective in lowering CP issuance rates (without going 
through the conventional transmission channels of interest rate cuts; Bank of Japan, 
2009a: 48-50).
31 
In March and April 2010, Bank of Japan decided to retire some of the temporary 
measures (“provision of subordinated loans to banks”; “special funds-supplying 
operations to facilitate corporate financing”, and “stock purchases held by financial 
institutions”) introduced in Autumn 2008/Spring 2009. 
4.  Lessons learnt from the 1990s - Japan and other major economies 
Table 3 provides synopses of monetary policy measures applied during the recent 
financial crisis and compares reactions by BoJ with those of Eurosystem (ECB), Bank of 
England (BoE), and US Fed. All four central banks have considerably expanded their 
monetary policy toolkits, although some of the measures taken have been phased out in 
the meantime. The measures aim at guaranteeing consistency of short-term market 
interest rates with policy rates, to provide financial stability, and to support firm access 
to non-bank credit markets. While the number of ‘new policy instruments’ introduced 
by BoJ is large, they differ from both the policy measures adopted by Japanese 
authorities during the 1990s and from reactions of other central banks during the recent 
crisis. 
During the first financial crisis, the Japanese interbank market almost collapsed 
when in early November 1997, ‘Sanyo Securities’ failed, a securities house which acted 
as a borrower in the interbank market. Although the amount of the default was 
relatively small, lender banks preferred placing their money with the Bank of Japan, to 
lending in the interbank market, for fear of being caught by another default. The 
consequence was that major financial institutions failed on an almost weekly basis, until 
BoJ stepped in and injected massive liquidity into the market in late November 1997 
(Nakaso, 2001). 
                                                 
31 In fact, the effects on CP issuance rates varied considerably by credit rating and were most powerful 
with respect to a-1 ratings. See Bank of Japan (2009a: 50). EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Table 3: Policy Reactions by Major Central Banks after the Collapse of Lehman Brothers 
Objective Policy  measure  BoJ  ECB BoE Fed 
Reduction in 
funding costs  Policy interest rate cutsa) 
From 
0.50% to 
0.10% 
From 
4.25% to 
1.00 % 
From 
5.00% to 
0.50 % 
From 
2.00% to 
0.00-0.25% 
Interest rates on excess reserves  +  +b)  +  + 
Exceptional fine-tuning 
operations  + + + + 
Introduction of fixed-rate 
tenders with full allotment  +c)  +d)  -  - 
Narrower corridor on overnight 
rates  -  + + + 
Consistency of 
market rates 
with policy 
rates 
Change in reserve requirements  -  -  +f)  - 
US Dollar repos/inter central-
bank swap lines  + + + + 
Expansion of eligible collateral  +  +  +  + 
Provision of subordinated debt  +  +  +  + 
Exceptional long-term 
operations  +  -  -  - 
Purchases of stocks held by 
financial institutions  +  - - - 
Financial 
system stability 
Supporting measures of 
individual financial institutions  -  +e)  -  + 
CP funding/ purchase/ collateral 
eligibility  + -  + + 
CB funding/ purchase/ collateral 
eligibility  +  -  +  - 
Outright purchases of 
Government Bonds  + -  + + 
Supporting 
non-bank credit 
markets 
ABS funding/ purchase/ 
collateral eligibility  -  +  +  + 
a) Bank of Japan (BoJ): Target rate for the uncollateralized overnight call rate; Eurosystem (ECB): Main refinancing 
operations (fixed rate); Bank of England (BoE): Bank rate paid on commercial bank reserves; US Federal Reserve (Fed): 
Target federal funds rate. 
b) Temporary increase in interest rate on excess reserves. 
c) Special fund-supplying operations to facilitate corporate financing. 
d) Fixed-rate tenders in main refinancing operations. 
e) By single NCBs. 
f) Expanded range over which reserves are remunerated. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2009b: 97); Bank of Japan (2009a: 15); Central Bank’s Websites. U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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 In contrast to this episode, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, all central 
banks reacted immediately by injecting liquidity into the market, knowing that a collapse 
of the interbank markets might result in a domino effect and systemic financial 
instability. Providing immediate financial assistance to banks was the first major lesson 
learnt by the Japanese authorities from the financial crisis of the 1990s. 
The second lesson concerns the introduction of accommodative policy measures 
and the switch to a more expansionary monetary policy. While during the 1990s, BoJ 
reduced its policy rate only gradually, from six percent in 1992 to zero percent in 1999, 
almost the same interest rate reduction was implemented during the current crisis within 
only 16 months (Shirakawa, 2009). After the Lehman collapse, the sharpest cut was 
implemented by BoE (450 basis points), followed by the ECB (325 basis points) and the 
Fed (175 basis points), which had already lowered interest rates from 5.25 percent in 
June 2006 to 2.0 percent in April 2008. Since interest rates were already very low in 
Japan, interest cuts by BoJ were less pronounced (Bank of Japan, 2009a: 16). While 
monetary policy in Japan during the 1990s was often criticized as doing ‘too little, too 
late’, the current policy reaction by central banks was faster and much more aggressive. 
The third lesson concerns financial assistance through a LLR. Even though 
constructive ambiguity may limit moral hazard, the drawback of this policy is that the 
central bank loses transparency and accountability. Ambiguity could also force illiquid, 
but solvent banks (that still have a positive net present value) into bankruptcy. Moral 
hazard may also be constrained through other means – such as firing the senior 
management of a failed bank or using shareholder capital as a senior source for covering 
losses. During the recent financial crisis, authorities did not make their LLR policies 
transparent, bailing out some investment banks but not others, e.g., in the case of 
Lehman Brothers. This policy differs from LLR policies by BoJ, which had learnt during 
the 1990s that maintaining ‘ambiguity’ about a central bank’s policy as a LLR is not 
necessarily constructive, especially if the stability not only of a single bank, but of the 
whole banking sector is in danger. Rather, during the first crisis, BoJ decided not to 
maintain constructive ambiguity in pursuing its role as a LLR, but to base its policy on a 
set of predetermined principles (Nakaso, 2001). Since Japanese banks did not take 
excessive risks before the recent turmoil, the Japanese case suggests that a 
renouncement of constructive ambiguity may not necessarily imply adverse incentives 
for banks. 
Because market participants might lose incentives to trade at a market rate slightly 
above zero (if margins no longer cover transaction costs), all central banks started to pay 
interest on excess reserve balances and offered a ‘complementary deposit facility’.
32 Such 
a facility did not exist in Japan during the 1990s and authorities in Japan and other 
countries learnt that the functioning of the money market is impeded, if the key interest 
rate is lowered to zero (Mizuno, 2009; Shiratsuka, 2009: 9).
33 The purpose of an interest-
                                                 
32 In the case of the Eurosystem, such a facility already existed and ECB raised interest rates paid on 
excess reserve balances; this increase was recalled later, but partially reintroduced in May 2009. 
33 See also Baba et al. (2005: 16), who report from the 1990s, the situation that when the interbank rate 
was 0.001 percent, the return of an investment of 10 billion Yen in the interbank market was only 273 
Yen which did not even cover trading costs. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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bearing deposit facility is to prevent just such a situation.
34 Its drawback, however, is 
that it drains off liquidity from the interbank markets (Furfine, 2003). Banks with excess 
liquidity deposit funds at accounts with the central bank instead of lending it to the 
market. Banks with a liquidity shortage become dependent on fund-supplying 
operations by the central bank. Consequently, central banks must recycle liquidity and 
play the role of money market brokers. They thus have to practice ‘quantitative’ or 
‘qualitative easing’. 
Quantitative easing occurred during the recent financial crisis in the UK, the US, 
and in the EMU, where bank accounts with the central bank rose alarmingly and central 
bank balance sheets rose dramatically in scale. This expansion was especially 
pronounced in the case of BoE and the US Fed, followed by the Eurosystem. BoJ’s 
balance sheet, however, remained almost constant between 2007 and 2009 (Mizuno, 
2009; European Central Bank, 2009a; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011; Table 4). Prior to 
the financial turmoil, the US Fed had the smallest balance sheet, both relative to 
banknotes outstanding and to GDP. Its size almost doubled between June 2007 and 
August 2009 and made the Fed’s balance sheet the largest, at least in proportion to 
banknotes. The increase in size of the balance sheet (in terms of banknotes) was smaller 
for the Eurosystem (35 %) and for BoJ (25 %). BoJ had the largest balance sheet before 
the financial crisis, but the smallest relative to banknotes outstanding in August 2009 
(European Central Bank, 2009a).
35 The Bank, therefore, resisted acting as a money 
market broker, despite the fact that amounts outstanding on the call money market 
decreased significantly (Bank for International Settlements, 2009a: 98; Bank of Japan, 
2009a: 20). Consequently, nominal and real short-term interest rates fell in Japan, but to 
a much lesser extent than in the US and in the Euro area (IMF, 2010b). 
 
                                                 
34 Another objective is to prevent central banks from taking on too much counterparty risk in intraday real 
time gross settlement systems. See Ennis and Weinberg (2007). 
35 Between August 2008 and April 2009, real central bank assets rose 250 percent (US Fed and BoE) and 
around 150 percent (ECB), but remained almost constant in the case of BoJ. See IMF (2009). U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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Table 4: Relative Size of Central Banks: Bank of Japan, Eurosystem, US Federal Reserve 
Total assets on the simplified 
balance sheet
1) relative to GDP 
(in %) 
Total assets on the simplified 
balance sheet
1) relative to 
banknotes in circulation (in %)   
June 
2007 
Peak 
(Date) 
August 
2009  June 2007  Peak 
(Date) 
August 
2009 
BoJ 16  23 
(31/03/2009) 22  111  144 
(31/03/2009)  139 
Eurosystem  10  19 
(02/01/2009) 16  144  231 
(02/01/2009)  194 
US Fed  6  15 
(17/12/2008) 14  109  266 
(17/12/2008)  232 
1) Partly aggregated and netted financial statements of central banks. 
Source: European Central Bank (2009a: 96). 
 
Quantitative easing was accompanied by qualitative easing, i.e., a change in central 
bank assets structure towards more risky and towards long-term assets. The Fed began 
to buy risky assets in February 2009, when it decided to start outright purchases of 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and of long-term Agency Bonds. In the meantime, 
the volume of MBSs held by the Fed exceeds more than one trillion USD (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2011). Eurosystem lowered the minimum rating of assets eligible as 
collateral to “BBB” and even accepted asset backed securities with a minimum rating of 
“A-” as eligible collateral. In Spring 2010, it also started outright purchases of sovereign 
government bonds under the newly created Securities Markets Program (European 
Central Bank, 2010). In addition, the ECB substantially increased the duration of its 
money-supplying operations during the crisis. Eurosystem normally provides liquidity to 
the markets by granting loans to commercial banks against collateral. Before the start of 
the financial turmoil, about 75 percent of all liquidity-providing operations were short-
term, in the form of main refinancing operations with a duration of 7 days; the rest were 
long-term operations with a duration of 90 days. Since 2007, Eurosystem increased the 
share of long-term operations significantly to 60 percent and extended the term of these 
loans to 180 days and to more than one year in June 2009 (European Central Bank, 
2008b; Neumann, 2009). 
In contrast, Bank of Japan pursued qualitative easing to a lesser degree than other 
central banks (Mizuno, 2009). The Bank accepted debt instruments with credit ratings 
of “B- or higher” as collateral. The Bank temporarily purchased commercial papers (CP) 
and corporate bonds (CB) with credit ratings of “a-1” (in the case of CPs) and “A or 
higher” (in case of CBs; Bank of Japan, 2011a). Moreover, BoJ generated excess reserves 
after the Lehman collapse, mainly by providing short-term funds in the form of its 
‘special fund-supplying operations to facilitate corporate financing’, with a duration of 
three months. In addition, it had set ceilings for the amounts outstanding of 
government bonds it purchased, for outright purchases of CPs and CBs and for the 
provision of subordinated loans to banks. BoJ has also set a time limit for the various 
special measures. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Exiting from quantitative and qualitative easing can be difficult and tedious, yet 
another lesson learnt from the 1990s. During the first financial crisis, BoJ needed more 
than a decade to abandon ZIRP and QEP and return to normal policy measures. BoJ 
had committed itself to continuing ZIRP and QEP, as long as it was needed to eradicate 
price deflation. It decided to terminate both measures only if the year-on-year rate of 
change in the consumer price index reached or exceeded zero percent for four 
consecutive months. This was the case only in Spring 2006. For the US Fed and the 
Eurosystem, an early exit from quantitative and qualitative easing, as well as from ZIRP 
may also not be possible, because rising bank reserves were financed by issuing or 
collateralizing long-term and risky assets. Exiting from these non-standard monetary 
policy measures will become difficult for central banks, if upside risks to price stability 
emerge before problems in interbank markets disappear and market participants 
perceive a reduction in counterparty and liquidity risks (Stark, 2009). 
By the time of writing this paper, US Fed and Eurosystem have both begun 
exiting from non-standard monetary policy measures. In December 2009, the US Fed 
established a term deposit facility and announced paying higher interest on reserve 
balances or undertaking various actions that reduce the stock of reserves. However, it 
has not yet been decided when the move toward such normalization will begin (Board 
of Governors at the Federal Reserve System, 2011). Also in December 2009, ECB 
decided to embark on a gradual phasing-out of some of the non-standard policy 
measures, terminated 12-month and six-month operations and decided to return to 
variable rate tender procedures in their regular three month operations (European 
Central Bank, 2009b; Stark, 2010). The phasing-out had to be postponed, however, due 
to the emerging sovereign debt crisis.
36 Due to emerging upside risks on inflation, 
Eurosystem raised its main policy rate by 25 basis points in April 2011 and June 2011, 
respectively. 
Observers cast doubt on whether these exit strategies are likely to succeed 
(Mizuno, 2009). Critics argue that neither the Fed nor the Eurosystem have yet made 
clear when and under what conditions they will finally terminate their QEP or use the 
tools mentioned above. While BoJ had announced in October 2003 that it will maintain 
QEP until core CPI inflation becomes stable at zero (or above), a similar announcement 
would not be credible in the current situation. If exiting from this rescue operation is 
not credible, banks will not use their extra-profits to recapitalize their balance sheets and 
central banks will be forced to extend QEP. Hence, a credible exit strategy will be of 
considerable importance. 
The final lesson learnt from the financial crisis in the 1990s – but one that is 
beyond the realm of monetary policy – should finally be mentioned. In the event of 
bank failures, a resolution or restructuring mechanism is needed that regulates how to 
dissolve or restructure a failed bank. Normal bankruptcy procedures applied to non-
financial firms are often insufficient and, hence, special restructuring laws for financial 
institutions are needed. The Japanese authorities enacted such a law in 1998 and 
founded a ‘bridge bank’ that acquired bad loans from failing banks (Nakaso, 2001; 
Bebenroth et al., 2009). Other countries did not possess such a legal mechanism before 
                                                 
36 In December 2011, ECB decided to continue the policy of ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative easing’. See 
European Central Bank (2011). U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
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the failure of Lehman Brothers and therefore had to enact resolution and restructuring 
procedures during the recent financial crisis. Since these laws also regulate the 
management of a failed institution, they create incentives for management ex ante not to 
take excessive risks. Possibly, the fact that Japan did have such legislation at the outset 
of the recent crisis, was another reason why Japanese banks were not heavily engaged in 
the markets for subprime-related and structured financial products before the recent 
financial turmoil. 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we describe the reactions by the Bank of Japan during the current 
financial crisis and compare them with measures taken during the 1990s and with 
current reactions by other central banks. We show that after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, central banks immediately offered financial assistance to the financial sector, 
enlarged the range of eligible collateral and increased the number of counterparties. In 
addition, they rapidly reduced interest rates and started to pay interest on excess bank 
reserves, so as to prevent interbank markets from collapsing. With these measures, 
current monetary policy reactions differ from the reactions in Japan during the 1990s, 
when BoJ waited several weeks before acting as a lender of last resort, only gradually 
reduced policy rates and did not pay interest on excess balances. Immediate financial 
assistance, rapid transition to a more accommodative monetary policy and the 
introduction of a deposit facility are the major lessons learnt by central banks from the 
Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s.  
While all major central banks have in the meantime joined the ‘ZIRP-club’, the 
Bank of Japan has been much more resistant than the US Fed or the Eurosystem during 
the recent crisis, to switching to QEP. Although the amounts outstanding on Japanese 
interbank markets shrunk considerably between September 2008 and April 2009, BoJ 
did not significantly enlarge its balance sheet. It neither engaged in credit easing 
(because it mainly increased its short-term lending to banks), nor did it accept asset 
backed securities with low ratings as eligible collateral. Bank of Japan hence did not take 
such a large “swig from the bottle of quantitative/qualitative easing” which makes it 
easier to exit from QEP. In this respect, recent monetary policy responses by BoJ differ 
from both policy reactions during the 1990s and from recent reactions in the US and 
Euro area.  
The Japanese experience from the 1990s suggests that a return to standard 
monetary policy measures is a long-lasting and difficult process. How to exit easily from 
QEP remains an unanswered question. Three problems have to be considered. One is 
the tools that should be used and another is the circumstances that trigger the use of 
these tools. Finally, central banks have to establish credibility that they will start exiting 
when certain desirable changes in circumstances occur. The proper answers to these 
questions have still to be found. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Appendix: Time Line of Policy Measures taken by the Bank of Japan 
(2008-2010) 
Date Measure 
2008  
Sep. 18, 2008  Introduction of US Dollar fund-supplying operations; 
Sep. 29, 2008  Expansion of US Dollar fund-supplying operations; 
Oct. 14, 2008 
Expansion of securities lending facility; 
Expansion of purchase of JGBs with Repo agreements; 
Expansion of US Dollar fund-supplying operations; 
Provision of sufficient funds over the year-end (40 trillion Y); 
Increase in frequency and size of CP repo operations; 
Expansion in the range of ABCP as eligible collateral; 
Suspension of selling stocks held by the Bank of Japan; 
Oct. 31, 2008 
Reductions in policy interest rates:  
• New target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate: around 0.3%; 
• New basic loan rate: 0.5 %; 
Introduction of complementary deposit facility (rate applied: 0.1 %); 
Dec. 02, 2008 
Introduction of “special fund-supplying operations to facilitate 
corporate financing”; 
Expansion of range of corporate debt as eligible collateral; 
Dec. 19, 2008 
Reductions in policy interest rates:  
• New target for uncollateralized overnight call rate: around 0.1%; 
• New basic loan rate: 0.3 %; 
Expansion in range of JGBs accepted in outright purchases; 
Outright purchases of JGBs (16.8 trillion Yen per year); 
Inclusion of Development Bank of Japan as counterparty in operations 
such as CP Repo op.; 
Expansion of “special fund-supplying operations to facilitate corporate 
financing”; 
Introduction of outright purchases of CPs; 
2009   
Jan. 22, 2009 
Acceptance of debt instruments issued by real estate investment corp. 
as eligible collateral; 
Expansion in range of JGBs accepted in outright purchases; U. Vollmer, R. Bebenroth, The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
77
Expansion of outright purchases of CPs; 
Introduction of outright purchases of Government bonds; 
Feb. 3, 2009  Resumption of stock purchases held by financial institutions (rating 
BBB- or better); 
Feb. 19, 2009 
Inclusion of government-guaranteed dematerialized CP in eligible 
collateral; 
Expansion of “special fund-supplying operations to facilitate corporate 
financing”; 
Expansion of outright purchases of Government bonds; 
Expansion of securities lending facility; 
Mar. 17, 2009  Provision of subordinated loans to banks; 
Mar. 18, 2009  Outright purchases of JGBs (21.6 trillion Y); 
Apr. 7, 2009  Expansion in range of eligible collateral for loans on deeds to public 
sector; 
Apr. 10, 2009  Provision of subordinated loans to banks; 
May 22, 2009  Acceptance of US, UK, German, French Government Bonds as eligible 
collateral; 
Jul. 15, 2009  Prolongation; 
Oct. 30, 2009  Expiration of temporary measures announced; 
2010  
Jan. 28, 2010   Expansion of US Dollar fund-supplying operations; 
Mar. 31, 2010 
Expiration of “special funds-supplying operations to facilitate corporate 
financing”; 
Expiration of provision of subordinated loans to banks; 
April 30, 
2010  Expiration of “stock purchases held by financial institutions”; 
May 10, 2010  Reestablishment of US Dollar fund-supplying operations. 
Source: Bank of Japan (2011a) 
 